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Abstract. Covert channels aim to hide the existence of communication. Recently
proposed packet-timing channels encode covert data in inter-packet times, based
on models of inter-packet times of normal traffic. These channels are detectable
if normal inter-packet times are not independent identically-distributed, which
we demonstrate is the case for several network applications. We show that ~80%
of channels are detected with a false positive rate of 0.5%. We then propose an
improved channel that is much harder to detect. Only ~9% of our new channels
are detected at a false positive rate of 0.5%. Our new channel uses packet content
for synchronisation and works with UDP and TCP traffic. The channel capacity
reaches over hundred bits per second depending on overt traffic and network jitter.
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1 Introduction
The very fact that two parties are communicating can be actionable information, even
if an external observer cannot determine the contents of the messages being passed.
Covert channels aim to hide the very existence of communication, enabling parties to
convey information undetected [1]. Individuals and groups may have various reasons
to utilise covert channels (e.g. for communication or bypassing access controls), often
motivated by the existence of adversarial relationships. Examples include government
agencies versus criminal organisations, hackers versus company IT departments, or dis-
senting citizens versus their governments.
The prisoner problem is the de-facto model for covert channel communication [1].
Alice and Bob are thrown into prison and intend to escape. To agree on an escape plan
they need to communicate, but a warden monitors all their messages. If the warden finds
any signs of suspicious messages she will place Alice and Bob into solitary confinement
– making it impossible for them to escape. Alice and Bob must exchange innocuous
messages containing hidden information that hopefully the warden will not notice.
Recently researchers proposed covert channels encoded in inter-packet times, also
referred to as Inter Packets Gaps (IPGs). Gianvecchio et al. [2] and Sellke et al. [3]
proposed channels that are hard to detect because they perfectly mimic the shape of
IPG distributions of real applications. However, they are hard to detect only if IPGs
are independent identically-distributed (iid). Paxson et al. showed that Telnet traffic
exhibits this behaviour [4]. However, we found that IPGs of several applications, such
as UDP-based game and VoIP traffic and TCP traffic, often are not iid because there is
auto-correlation. The channel proposed in [2,3] is easy to detect with such applications.
The channel in [2,3] requires accessible sequence numbers in the overt traffic. Oth-
erwise any lost packets desynchronise covert sender and receiver. TCP provides se-
quence numbers, but not all UDP-based traffic has sequence numbers, or they may not
be accessible if the protocol is encrypted.
We propose an improved channel, based on techniques for information hiding in
images (steganography), which is harder to detect when IPGs are not iid. Our new tech-
nique generates the random numbers needed for encoding from the packets themselves,
which makes the channel robust enough for use with all UDP-based protocols.
First, we motivate our work by demonstrating that several applications have auto-
correlated IPGs. We then present the improved covert channel. We show that for traffic
with auto-correlated IPGs the existing timing channel is easy to detect with ~80% accu-
racy and a false positive rate of 0.5%1. Our new channel is much harder to detect. The
detection accuracy reduces to only ~9% with a false positive rate of 0.5%. A drawback
of our new channel is a reduced robustness against network jitter. However, based on a
proof-of-concept implementation we show that the channel capacity is still high enough
for practical use, even across uncongested Internet paths with more than 10 hops. The
capacity ranges from a few bits per second to over hundred bits per second, depending
on the overt traffic’s packet rate and network jitter.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines related work. In Section 3 we
show that several applications often have auto-correlated IPGs. In Section 4 we propose
our new channel. In Section 5 we analyse the detection accuracy for the channel in [2,3]
and our improved channel using machine learning. In Section 6 we analyse the capacity
of our improved channel. Section 7 concludes and outlines future work.
2 Related Work
The possibility of encoding covert channels in the timing of packets (or frames) was
identified early by Padlipsky et al. [5]. However, all the timing channels proposed prior
to Berk’s work [6] were based on encoding in varying packet rates over time as opposed
to encoding in IPG values directly. For space reasons we do not discuss them here and
instead refer the reader to [1].
Berk et al. introduced packet-timing channels where the covert information is en-
coded in the IPGs of consecutive packets [6]. They compared channels with two IPGs
and multiple IPGs, and developed a mechanism by which the sender can pick the
optimal symbol distribution in multi-symbol channels. Sha et al. developed a “bug”
that hooks into the connection between keyboard and computer and ex-filtrates all
keystrokes by modulating the IPGs of network traffic send by the victim [7]. Gian-
vecchio et al. later showed that both of these channels are easy to detect [8].
Gianvecchio et al. [2] developed a stealthier IPG timing channel and evaluated its
performance. They proposed to fit a model to the IPG distribution of real traffic and
then use the model to generate a covert channel with identical distribution. If the IPGs
1 In reality most flows are normal flows, so a detector’s false positive rate must be low or covert
channels are effectively masked (see Section 5).
of normal traffic are iid this channel cannot be detected. Sellke et al. proposed another
scheme for encoding covert data in IPGs and evaluated its performance based on exper-
iments across the Internet [3]. Similar to [2] they also showed that timing channels can
be made indistinguishable from normal traffic by mimicking normal iid IPGs.
Luo et al. proposed to encode covert data into the length of TCP data bursts, where a
data burst is a number of TCP segments sent before the next TCP ACK arrives [9]. The
channel is robust against packet jitter, loss and reordering, but has very low capacity.
Furthermore, its stealth is low, as flows with covert channel behave very different from
normal flows [9]. Liu et al. introduced a channel that encodes covert data such that the
normal distribution of IPGs is closely approximated and spreading techniques are used
to provide robustness [10]. Their covert channel is hard to detect with simple shape and
regularity tests, however these tests are known to be insufficient [8].
3 Inter-packet Times Analysis
We analyse the IPGs of several applications. Our results illustrate the existence of IPG
auto-correlation for certain types of traffic.
3.1 Datasets and methodology
We analysed two UDP-based applications, the First Person Shooter (FPS) game Quake
III Arena (Q3) [11] and the VoIP application Skype. The Q3 client-to-server traffic was
taken from trace files collected at our public game server. It contains traffic from 106
clients. The Q3 server-to-client traffic analysis is based on trace files captured at a client
that connected to 224 different game servers. We analysed the IPGs of 44 traffic flows
of Skype one-to-one calls collected by Branch et al. [12].
We also analysed a mix of UDP and TCP traffic from the Twente traces [13]. Since
the trace does not contain payload data we do not know the applications. Based on the
port numbers it seems most of the TCP flows were bulk-transfers: HTTP, FTP, or peer-
to-peer file sharing applications, such as BitTorrent. A large part of the UDP flows were
game traffic, for example Half-Life/Counterstrike and Quake. In total the dataset has
111 UDP and 214 TCP unidirectional traffic flows from different sources.
For each flow we computed the auto-correlation over the first 5 000 IPGs. Auto-
correlation is the cross-correlation of a time series with itself. Let xt be the IPG value at
time t, let µ and σ be the mean and variance over all t, let τ be the time lag and E (.) be
the expectation value. The auto-correlation function (ACF) for one traffic flow is:
R (τ) =
E ((xt − µ) (xt+τ − µ))
σ2
. (1)
For a set of n traffic flows of one dataset we compute the ensemble average over all
ACFs (referred to as average ACF). The average ACF at lag τ is defined as the mean of
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Fig. 1. Average auto-correlation for Q3 client-to-server (left), Skype (middle) and TCP (right)
traffic (zoomed y-axis)
We analyse the auto-correlation of IPGs and least significant parts of IPGs. We
define the least significant part as:






where d is the IPG and l is the size of the least significant part. For example, if the
IPG is 21.75 ms and l = 1 ms then dlsp = 0.75 ms (sub-millisecond part).
3.2 Results
Figure 1 shows the average ACFs of Q3 client-to-server, Skype and TCP traffic for the
full IPGs and decreasing least significant parts (τ ≤ 100). The average ACF of the full
IPGs decays more rapidly than individual ACFs (e.g. the one shown in Figure 2(left)),
as individual ACFs have lows and highs at different places. Still it is significantly larger
than the average ACF for small least significant parts.
For the UDP-based applications IPGs are often at least moderately correlated. How-
ever, smaller least significant parts of IPGs are largely uncorrelated. The size of the least
significant part where correlation diminishes depends on the application. The TCP flows
show less correlation, but many flows still have low to moderate correlation.
IPGs of applications where packet send times are human-driven and effectively
random were shown to be iid (e.g. Telnet [4]). However, for other applications auto-
correlation of IPGs tends to exist because of large-time-scale behaviours, such as the
congestion window growth/collapse for TCP or the application’s encoding for games or
VoIP over UDP. Network jitter reduces existing correlations, but even after many hops
often there is some correlation. Furthermore, if the warden is close to the covert sender,
the IPGs observed are largely unaffected by network jitter.
The small time-scale behaviour (exposed by looking only at the least significant part
of IPGs) is jittered by largely uncorrelated noise, for example queuing delays at each
hop. Our new encoding technique exploits this effect.
4 Covert Channel
We first review the previous encoding scheme on which our improved scheme is based
and then propose our improved technique.
4.1 Basic encoding
In Gianvecchio’s and Sellke’s encoding scheme [2, 3] the covert sender (Alice) and
receiver (Bob) share a model of the IPGs, which was previously generated based on an
analysis of real traffic. The model can be a histogram of measured IPGs or a standard
statistical distribution fitted to the observed IPGs.
Alice and Bob also need synchronised random number generators. They have to
agree on a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)
and a seed value. The seed value can be derived from Alice’s and Bob’s shared secret.
Let R = r1, r2, . . . , rn be the sequence of Uniform(0,1) random numbers generated
and s be a symbol out of the set of possible symbols S . For example, a binary channel
has two symbols: S = {s1, s2} = {0, 1}. Then Alice encodes covert bits as follows. Each
discrete symbol is transformed into a continuous symbol:






mod 1 = rs . (4)
The IPGs d1, d2, . . . , dn are produced by the encoding function:
Fenc = F−1model (rs) = d , (5)
where F−1model is the inverse distribution function of the model. Bob decodes the bits
from the observed IPGs d̃1, d̃2, . . . , d̃n, which is Alice’s series modified by timing noise,
such as timing inaccuracies at the sender, network jitter and measuring inaccuracies at





= r̃s , (6)
where Fmodel is the distribution function of the model. The discrete symbol received
is:
Fdisc (r̃s, r) = |S | · ((r̃s − r) mod 1) = s̃ . (7)
This encoding scheme generates an IPG distribution that is indistinguishable from
the IPG distribution of normal traffic if normal IPGs are iid [2, 3]. However, as we
showed in the previous section this assumption is often not true. This makes the channel
detectable. Figure 2 shows the ACF of the IPGs of normal Q3 client-to-server traffic on
the left and the ACF of the IPGs of the covert channel in the middle. The IPG histograms
of normal traffic and covert channel (not shown) look alike, but the difference of the
ACFs is striking.

































Fig. 2. Auto-correlation of IPGs of normal Q3 traffic (left), covert channel in [2, 3] (middle) and
sub-band encoding with l = 5 ms (right)
4.2 Improved synchronisation
The basic encoding works only if the overt traffic has accessible sequence numbers.
Otherwise any packet loss permanently desynchronises Alice and Bob. Furthermore, if
Bob is unable to observe a transmission’s start he can never synchronise with Alice.
Synchronisation can be improved by computing R from the packets themselves.
Let H be a good hash function that maps the inputs as evenly as possible over the
output range (uniform distribution). Let B denote some part of an overt packet that is
immutable on the path from Alice to Bob, and let bi be the value of B for the i-th packet.
Random numbers are generated as follows:
ri = H (bi) . (8)
We assume that the inputs bi vary sufficiently so that the output of H is approx-
imately uniformly distributed. Previous work on packet sampling and one-way delay
measurement showed that generally this is the case if B is chosen properly, and sug-
gested several suitable choices for H and B [14]. TCP retransmissions may cause the
same inputs bi repeatedly, but using TCP header information Alice and Bob can ‘ignore’
them.
Alice and Bob need to agree on H and B. It is possible for a warden to guess H and
B and therefore to detect the covert channel, since the choices for H and B are limited.
Alice and Bob can use keyed hash functions used for Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) for higher security.
With our improved synchronisation technique lost packets can still cause lost bits,
but never a permanent desynchronisation.
4.3 Sub-band encoding
Now we present our new encoding scheme that is much stealthier if IPGs are not iid.
The scheme encodes covert bits only into the least significant part of IPGs as defined in
Equation 3.
Let l be the size of the least significant part of the IPGs. The parameter l determines
the trade-off between stealth and robustness. Let D be the range of IPGs (maximum
minus the minimum). Then an IPG distribution typically spans m = dD/le sub-bands of
Algorithm 1 Sender and receiver algorithm for sub-band encoding
function encode(packet, prev_pkt_time, pkt_time)
b = hash_input(packet)
orig_ipg = pkt_time − prev_pkt_time
base_ipg = borig_ipg/lc · l
band = BL [dstart = base_ipg] .x
bits = get_bits()
r = HR (b)
ipg = F(band)enc (Fcont (bits, r)) + base_ipg
return ipg
function decode(packet, prev_pkt_time, pkt_time)
b = hash_input(packet)
ipg = pkt_time − prev_pkt_time
base_ipg = bipg/lc · l
lsp = ipg − base_ipg
band = BL [dstart = base_ipg] .x
r = HR (b)
bits = Fdisc
(
F(band)dec (lsp) , r
)
return bits
size l, although in the extreme case it may fit in only a single sub-band. The location of
the sub-bands, the IPG value marking the start of each band, depends on the start value
of the first band. The location must be selected carefully to minimise the error rate for
a given IPG distribution.
For each of the sub-bands the basic encoding scheme is used. However, now we have
one probability distribution of the least significant part of the IPGs for each sub-band
j, resulting in F( j)enc (.) = F
−1( j)
model (.) and F
( j)
dec (.) = F
( j)
model (.). When building the model
from the example traffic a distribution of the least significant part of the IPGs must
be estimated for each sub-band. If the example traffic is only a small sample and the
number of bands is large there may be only a few or even zero values for some bands.
For such sub-bands as well as sub-bands outside the range covered by the example
traffic our algorithm augments the data with uniformly distributed random values so
that a minimum number of samples is reached.
Algorithm 1 shows the encoding algorithm. Let BL be a set of tuples
(
d( j)start, x j
)
that
associate each sub-band index x j with an absolute IPG value d
( j)
start marking the start
of the band (base IPG). First, the algorithm determines the actual sub-band based on
the original unmodified IPG. Then the modified IPG is the sum of the least significant
part as given by the sub-band model and the base IPG of the sub-band. Algorithm 1
also shows the decoding. The receiver selects the sub-band based on the observed IPG.
Then it computes the least significant part of the IPG and decodes the bits as before.
Figure 2(right) illustrates the effectiveness of sub-band encoding. The covert chan-
nel only very slightly decreases the auto-correlations. The drawback of sub-band encod-
ing is that it is less robust against network jitter, but network jitter is often small even on
longer paths. Our results in Section 6 show that the channel capacity is still high enough
for practical use, even across uncongested Internet paths with more than 10 hops. How-
ever, the scheme is also less robust against an active warden that can introduce artificial
jitter.
For active channels, where the covert sender also generates the overt traffic, sub-
band encoding requires models that model the shape of the distribution as well as
the auto-correlations, for example autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
models. The sender first uses the model to create a series of IPGs, and then uses the
encode() function to encode the covert data. For passive channels, where the covert
sender encodes the channel into existing traffic of unwitting hosts, the correlations are
already present in the intercepted traffic.
5 Detection
We use classifiers constructed by a supervised Machine Learning (ML) algorithm. Dur-
ing training supervised ML techniques build classifiers based on data instances with
class labels attached, so that the data instances are ‘optimally’ separated into the differ-
ent classes based on characteristics (features) of the instances other than the class label.
The classifiers are then used to classify data instances of unknown class.
5.1 Datasets and Features
As normal traffic we used the datasets from Section 3. The covert traffic was created
based on these datasets using sub-band encoding. For each normal flow we generated
one corresponding covert channel based on the same IPG distribution. We used the first
5 000 IPGs of each flow. The covert data was uniformly random distributed, as if Alice
and Bob used encryption. Each dataset had the same number of covert and normal flows
to avoid bias of the classifier towards a larger class.
Let X = [X1, . . . , Xn] be a series of IPGs of a flow with values x1, . . . , xn. For each X
we computed the first order entropy (Entropy) and an estimate of the entropy rate (En-
tropyRate) using the corrected conditional entropy (CCE) [8]. The first order entropy
is useful for comparing the shape of distributions of random variables, and the entropy
rate is useful for comparing the regularity of time series. For computing the CCE we
used equiprobable binning of the data as in [8]. To determine the number of bins Q we
performed initial tests and found Q = 5 maximised the classification accuracy.
We also computed a feature based on the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test, which tests the hypothesis that two samples were drawn from the same distribution.
A low KS test statistic means that the distributions are similar whereas a high KS test
statistic means the distributions are different. The KS test is applicable to a variety of
data with different distributions. Since we need a feature that reflects how different a
distribution is from the set of distributions characterising normal traffic, we computed
the set of KS test statistics between a data instance (covert or normal) and all instances
of normal traffic (excluding tests of a normal instance with itself) and use the mean of
all KS statistics (MeanKS).
5.2 Machine Learning
Previous research showed that for classification of network traffic the better ML tech-
niques provide similar accuracy, but differ greatly regarding training time and classifi-
cation speed [15]. We used the C4.5 decision tree classifier [16] – more precisely its
implementation in the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [17],
because it had performed well previously [15]. Using a decision tree algorithm also has
the advantage that a human can interpret the resulting classifier, although with increas-
ing size of the tree this becomes difficult.
C4.5 selects features in order of maximising an entropy-based gain ratio. The most
useful features are always used at the top of the tree and irrelevant features are largely
ignored. Hence, C4.5 is not adversely affected by irrelevant features like some other
techniques and feature pre-selection is not necessary. C4.5 attempts to avoid over-fitting
by removing some structure from a tree after it was built (tree pruning) [16]. In our
experiments we used the default WEKA 3.4.4 settings for all parameters of C4.5.
We evaluate the classification accuracy based on the following metrics. A true pos-
itive (TP) is a class instance correctly classified. A false positive (FP) is a non-class
member misclassified as class member and a false negative (FN) is a class member
misclassified as non-class member. Precision is the number of class members classified





Recall (or TP rate) is the number of class members classified correctly over the total





We performed 10-fold cross-validation for each dataset. The data set was randomly
divided into k subsets, and the classification was repeated k times. Each time, one of
the k subsets was used as the test set and the other k − 1 subsets formed the training set.
Then the average accuracy across all k trials was computed.
The classification accuracy varies depending on the random covert data, the random
number series used for encoding R, and the random selection of instances during the
cross-validation. Therefore, we performed the cross-validation 10 times and computed
the average accuracy.
5.3 Results
Figure 3 shows the precision and recall of the covert traffic class averaged over all
datasets for the basic covert channel proposed in [2, 3] and for sub-band encoding de-
pending on the size of the least significant part l. For small l precision and recall drop to
60% or lower. For larger l they increase substantially, but even for l = 25 ms precision
is still less than 80%, well below the 96% for the basic covert channel. We found the
resulting classifiers rely mainly on EntropyRate, but MeanKS is also used occasionally
at the bottom of the tree.
A recall of 70–80% for sub-band encoding still appears high. However, one needs
to take into account the large FP rate as indicated by the precision of 60–70%. In reality,
even when assuming the warden has already selected some traffic fraction of interest,
most flows are normal flows. Thus even a FP rate of only a few percent very effec-
tively masks the covert channel. To explore the detection accuracy at low FP rates we
computed the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves by using cost-sensitive
classification and varying the cost for misclassified instances of either class.
Figure 4 shows the low FP-rate part of the ROC curves for the covert traffic class
averaged over all datasets for the basic channel proposed in [2,3] and sub-band encoding
with a sub-band size of 5 ms. It shows that sub-band encoding is much harder to detect.
For a FP rate of 0.5% (indicated by the vertical dashed line) approximately 80% of the
basic channels are detected, whereas for sub-band encoding the detection accuracy is
































Fig. 3. Precision and recall of covert traffic
class for basic encoding and sub-band encod-
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Fig. 4. ROC curves of covert traffic class for
the basic covert channel proposed in [2,3] and
sub-band encoding with l = 5 ms
6 Channel Capacity
We propose a model to compute the channel capacity, describe our experimental setup,
and present the measured channel capacities based on different network jitter.
6.1 Channel Model
We assume the channel’s output only depends on the input and the errors but not on pre-
vious inputs (memoryless channel) and we focus on a binary channel (one bit encoded
per IPG). Timing jitter causes bit substitution errors. Under timing jitter we subsume
packet timing inaccuracies at the covert sender, timestamping inaccuracies at the covert
receiver and network jitter.
In our testbed experiments the resulting error rates were approximately symmetric.
Hence we model the channel as Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a capacity [18]:
C = 1 − H (p) = 1 + p · log 2 (p) + (1 − p) · log 2 (1 − p) , (11)
where H(.) is the binary entropy and p is the probability of timing errors. The capac-
ity C is in bits per IPG (bits per symbol). Given an average rate of IPGs fS the average
transmission rate in bits per second is:
R = C · fS . (12)
6.2 Testbed and Methodology
We implemented a prototype of sub-band encoding, using the Covert Channels Eval-
uation Framework (CCHEF) [19], which was carefully designed to maximise Alice’s
packet timing accuracy. However, since it is a userspace program it competes with other
userspace programs for CPU time. Other programs using a lot of CPU time decrease
the timing accuracy. To avoid this we used real-time Linux 2.6.20 and ran Alice and
Bob as real-time processes with high priority. We also set the kernel’s tick frequency to
10 kHz to reduce the size of time slices.
Our testbed consisted of two computers connected via a Fast Ethernet switch. We
used scp to perform file transfers capped at 2 Mbit/s, and SSH to perform remote inter-
active shell sessions. We generated Q3 with bots as players. Each experiment lasting 20
minutes was repeated three times and we report the average statistics. Network delay
and jitter were emulated using Linux Netem [20]. The network delay was emulated us-
ing Pareto distributions with a mean of 25 ms and standard deviations (σ) of 0, 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, 0.5, 1 and 2 ms in each direction, since previous research suggested that network
jitter is heavy-tailed [21], and Netem only supports Uniform, Gaussian and Pareto jitter
distributions. Setting the kernel tick timer frequency to 10 kHz ensured delay emulation
was accurate to ±100 µs.
Figure 5 shows CDFs of the absolute IP Delay Variation (IPDV [22]), both in the
testbed with Pareto distributions with different σ and measured across two Internet
paths. The 8-hop Internet path’s RTT was approximately 32 ms, and the 13-hop path’s
RTT was approximately 46 ms. We estimated the one-way delay to half the measured
RTT. Both Internet path’s IPDV CDFs lie between the testbed CDFs for σ = [0.3, 0.5].
The IPG models were built as follows. First, we measured the IPG distribution of
each application at the source, unaffected by timing jitter. We then added a small amount
of noise. Without the added noise the covert channel would not work well for applica-
tions with very narrow IPG distribution, such as Q3 client-to-server and scp traffic. The
noise represents timing jitter caused by the network, or a high CPU or network interface
load of the source host, which the warden would also encounter in reality.
Our models were histograms with small bin sizes of 100 µs, as our traffic sources
cannot be modelled well with standard statistical distributions. For Q3 and SSH traf-
fic the location of the sub-bands was chosen such that peaks in the distributions are
approximately in the middle of bands.
6.3 Maximum transmission rates
We measured the error rates of the channel based on the network jitter and computed the
maximum transmission rates using Equations 11 and 12. Figure 6 shows the maximum
rates for sub-band encoding for a sub-band size of l = 5 ms. We selected this size
because it provides acceptable noise levels for σ ≤ 0.5 ms at a reasonably low detection
accuracy (see Section 5). Note that for TCP traffic the channel can only be encoded
in one direction due to the timing dependencies between packets in both directions.
Multiple TCP flows could be used to achieve full-duplex communication.
Sub-band encoding has significantly higher error rates with Q3 client-to-server traf-
fic or scp compared to Q3 server-to-client traffic or SSH (not shown). However, the
transmission rates are still much higher for Q3 client-to-server traffic and scp because
of the much higher packet rates. Sub-band encoding has low error rates and reason-
ably high capacities at low levels of jitter typical of uncongested paths. Transmission
rates are up to over hundred bits per second. If the network jitter is high the capacity is
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Fig. 5. Absolute IPDV distributions for
testbed and two Internet paths
































Fig. 6. Maximum transmission rates for sub-
band encoding
severely reduced. However, larger sub-band sizes could be used to increase robustness
at the cost of reducing the stealth.
Q3 and scp have narrow IPG distributions, and in our experiments even interactive
SSH was limited because we played back a short recorded session repeatedly. Applica-
tions with wider IPG distributions can provide more robust channels. However, bit rates
would still be relatively low since such applications also have lower packet rates.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We showed that Gianvecchio’s and Sellke’s IPG timing channel [2, 3] is easy to de-
tect with ~80% accuracy if the IPGs of normal traffic are not iid. Inspired by image
steganography we developed an improved encoding scheme for IPG timing channels
that is much harder to detect. The detection accuracy is reduced down to ~9%. The
random numbers needed for encoding are generated from the packet content, which
makes the new channel usable with all UDP-based traffic. Our new channel has reduced
robustness, but it still provides a reasonably high channel capacity.
We performed experiments with a proof-of-concept implementation in a testbed
with different emulated network jitter. The new channel has low error rates and rea-
sonably high capacities for lower network jitter, comparable to measured jitter on
short/medium uncongested Internet paths. Transmission rates are up to over one hun-
dred bits per second, depending on the overt traffic. However, the capacity is severely
reduced if the network jitter is high.
In future work our channel model could be extended to include the effects of packet
loss. Our analysis could be extended to a wider range of applications generating the
overt traffic, and to a larger range of network conditions including packet loss. The
sender’s timing accuracy could be potentially improved with a future kernel-based im-
plementation. Another avenue for future studies are passive channels, where the covert
sender encodes the channel into existing traffic of unwitting hosts.
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